Cryptographic inventory & post-quantum readiness

You can’t migrate the cryptography you can’t see.

Post Quantum Leap finds every certificate, protocol and cipher in your infrastructure, grades them against your policy, and shows you how far you are from post-quantum. Built for the security, PKI and compliance teams responsible for getting there.

  • Managed · your cloud · on-prem
  • Active TLS scanning
Endpoint
Key exchange
Post-quantum
portal.example.ch
X25519
Vulnerable
vpn.example.ch
ECDHE-RSA
Vulnerable
ldap.example.ch:636
RSA-2048
Vulnerable
api.example.ch
X25519MLKEM768
Quantum-ready
mail.example.ch:993
DHE-RSA
Vulnerable
+ 2,847 endpoints 4 of 5 quantum-vulnerable

The hostnames are invented, the pattern is real: four of these five endpoints use a key exchange that a quantum computer will break. Today, all five look healthy.

Why now

Are you already too late?

Adversaries record encrypted traffic today and decrypt it once quantum hardware catches up — harvest now, decrypt later. Whether that makes you late already is arithmetic, not opinion. Three numbers, your numbers:

10 years
5 years
2035

Data you encrypt today still needs protection in 2041 — 6 years after the quantum computer you just assumed. On your own numbers, you are 6 years too late.

What your regulator actually requires, and by when →

Nobody knows the arrival year: the US Office of Management and Budget confirmed in writing in June 2026 that no cryptographically relevant quantum computer is known to exist. That is why the third slider is yours to set. The other two are the ones you control.

Behind this sit real deadlines — the EU, Germany’s BSI, a US executive order — and FINMA’s guidance for the Swiss institutions it supervises.

The full picture, with sources →

Migration reality

Post-quantum certificates are not a drop-in replacement.

A signature that fits in 64 bytes today takes thousands of bytes post-quantum — on every certificate, in every handshake.

ECDSA P-256
in use today
64 B
RSA-2048
in use today
256 B
ML-DSA-44
FIPS 204 · category 2
2,420 B ×38
ML-DSA-87
FIPS 204 · category 5
4,627 B ×72

Signature sizes from NIST FIPS 204; multiples relative to ECDSA P-256. A certificate chain carries several signatures and public keys, so the bytes multiply before they travel.

The question is not whether the network can carry the bytes — it is which endpoints, appliances and embedded clients cannot, and what every renewal touches. That is an inventory question.

See what a scan finds

Which algorithms your regulator actually approves →

What it does

From “we think we know” to a list you can act on.

Discover

Find every endpoint, including the ones a network scan cannot reach

Active TLS scanning reads certificates, chains, protocols, cipher suites and forward secrecy from anything that speaks TLS. Where the network cannot look inside, a small scanner runs on the host itself.

  • Reads the full TLS handshake, sweeps whole network ranges, and works through your proxies
  • The host scanner covers Windows certificate stores, internal CAs and machines without internet access
  • A DMZ, an isolated OT segment or a branch network is reached by a remote engine you deploy inside it — it dials out to Post Quantum Leap, so no inbound firewall rule is needed
  • Host scanners in that segment submit to the engine rather than to the server, so they need no path out of it either
  • Scan speed is adjustable down to stealth, so a scan never looks like an attack
  • Import what you cannot scan: certificate files, CBOM, or a pasted host list
The endpoints view of the inventory: a table of hosts with grade, post-quantum status, soonest expiry, source and owner.

Inventory

One inventory that shows what every renewal touches

Endpoints and certificates sit in one table: one place to search, filter and export, instead of several tools that each hold part of the answer.

  • See how many endpoints share a certificate before you replace it
  • Trust chains are verified against the public CA stores, and every certificate keeps its history
  • Filter by SAN, subject, CAA, reachability, forward secrecy or issuing CA
  • Export any filtered view to Excel or a CycloneDX CBOM
The certificates view of the inventory, including a column counting how many endpoints each certificate is used on.

Grade

Your definition of good, applied consistently

Start from one of two built-in policies: SSL Labs compatible, or strict post-quantum. Then change any single algorithm rule without losing the rest.

  • Allow, forbid or cap the grade of individual protocols, ciphers, key exchanges and signature hashes
  • Decide how much each category weighs, where grade boundaries sit, and when expiry counts as urgent
  • A policy change re-grades everything instantly, without a new scan
  • Every weakness comes with a recommended fix
The policy page: a notice that changes re-grade everything without a re-scan, above the rating framework, per-category weights and grade cutoffs.

Report

Report against the frameworks you are measured on

Ten framework packs, assessed continuously against your live inventory: NIST PQC, CNSA 2.0, BSI TR-02102, NIST IR 8547, PCI DSS 4.0, FIPS 140-3, ANSSI, MAS TRM — plus FINMA Guidance 05/2026 for the institutions a Swiss regulator supervises, and a harvest-now-decrypt-later view. They measure different things, so their numbers differ; each page shows what it actually checks.

  • A quantum-safe handshake in front of a classical certificate is not counted as ready
  • The FINMA view reports against Guidance 05/2026 as written — a recommendation rather than a circular, so its quantum rules warn where a binding rule would fail, and the report says which it is
  • The harvest-now-decrypt-later view weighs how long recorded traffic must stay secret against the year its key exchange is estimated to break — and is labelled as our own model rather than a published standard, because it is one
  • An asset nobody has labelled for sensitivity is left out of that percentage rather than counted as a failure
  • Each pack states what it cannot see as plainly as what it can: FIPS 140-3 cannot establish CMVP module validation, and says so rather than implying it
  • Per-endpoint evidence behind every verdict — one row per endpoint, naming the rule that decided it, and each row opens that endpoint
  • Independent of your own grading policy, so an auditor sees the framework’s rules, not your local ones
  • Export any pack to Excel
The compliance page: a grid of framework cards — NIST PQC, CNSA 2.0, BSI TR-02102, NIST IR 8547, PCI DSS 4.0 and FIPS 140-3 — each with a readiness figure, a breakdown and key facts.

Proof

Don’t take our word for it.

A real scan, of this website

This is Post Quantum Leap scanning this very website, and reporting the hybrid post-quantum key exchange it negotiated.

Dependencies

See what actually depends on what

An interactive graph of services, protocols, cipher suites and algorithms for any target, coloured by post-quantum rating. Click a node and the whole chain around it lights up.

  • Available for network-scanned targets as well as hosts running the client scanner
  • Every node shows its post-quantum rating and the estimated year its algorithm stops being safe
  • It turns “we should migrate” into “migrating this affects these four services”

Dashboards you can drill into

No number has to be taken on trust: click any tile, bar or row and you see the endpoints it counted.

Why Post Quantum Leap

Why teams pick it.

It runs where your policy says it must

A complete map of your weakest cryptography is sensitive by definition, so you decide where it runs — up to fully air-gapped on your own hardware.

The policy is yours

Grading presets you can override algorithm by algorithm, not a vendor opinion baked into a score. Policies genuinely differ: Canton Bern, for instance, mandates FrodoKEM and Classic McEliece rather than ML-KEM.

Governance is built in

Owners, criticality and your own fields sit on the endpoint and survive every certificate renewal. Every change is recorded, and three roles are enforced everywhere, with Entra ID or any OpenID Connect sign-on.

Built in Switzerland

Post Quantum Leap is developed and supported by a Swiss company. The product, the people behind it and the support all sit under Swiss jurisdiction.

How it runs, and where

One container, one database, running where you choose.

  1. 01

    Point it at your infrastructure

    Paste a list of targets, import certificates as PEM or CBOM, or let a network sweep find them. Add host scanners where the network cannot reach.

  2. 02

    Let it scan

    Scans run in the background, on your schedule and in your timezone, with speed settings that keep intrusion detection quiet. Progress shows in the top bar.

  3. 03

    Track the migration

    Posture over time, a heatmap of criticality against migration effort, and a prioritised list of what to fix first.

The architecture and the three deployment models have their own page:

Architecture and deployment options →

Request a live demo

See it live, then try it yourself.

Around 30 to 45 minutes, online. We drive: nothing to install, no environment to prepare, no data needed from you. We walk through discovery, the inventory, the crypto graph and compliance reporting on a full demo installation, then spend most of the time on whatever is closest to your situation.

If you want to keep going after that, we can give you a login to a demo tenant, or set you up with a local install so you can try it against your own infrastructure.

What you get
A straight answer on whether Post Quantum Leap fits your infrastructure, including when it does not.

We reply within one working day. No newsletter, no tracking, and your details are not shared with anyone.